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of law and establish a flexible rule compatible with statutory case law and
modem securities transaction situations, the Supreme Court took a narrow
view of the Birnbaum doctrine, as well as the applicable antifraud provisions, and pronounced a rule which does not sufficiently recognize established modifications and exceptions. Since section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 do
not specify the class of person protected, a limiting doctrine may be
necessary; however, a flexible standard is also necessary in dealing with
various factual situations and to assure proper plaintiffs a cause of action. In
view of the broad, remedial purpose of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, this
decision is regrettable for it will deprive many deserving plaintiffs of a
remedy for fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
Roberta Gail Weatherby

LANDLORD'S LIEN STATUTE-Article 5236d-Landlord May Not
Exercise Contractual Lien Over Tenant's Property Without
Affording Opportunity for Prior Notice and Hearing
Fancherv. Cronan,
-

F.Supp. -

(S.D. Tex. 1975).

Joe Fancher moved into an apartment complex in Houston, and signed a
written rental agreement which included a contractual landord's lien pursuant to article 5236d of the Texas civil statutes.' After notifying Fancher of
1. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1975) provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. The operator of any residential house, apartment, duplex, or other single
or multi-family dwelling, shall have a lien upon all property stored by the tenant
within a storage room for all rentals due and unpaid by the tenant, except that property specifically exempted hereinafter.
Section 2. Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, there shall be exempt
from the lien set out in Section 1 above, the following: (1) all wearing apparel,
(2) all tools, apparatus and books belonging to any trade or profession, (3) school
books, (4) one automobile and one truck, (5) family library and all family portraits and pictures, (6) household furniture to the extent of one couch, two living
room chairs, dining table and chairs, (7) all beds and bedding, (8) all kitchen furniture and utensils, (9) all food and foodstuffs, (10) all medicine and other medical supplies, (11) all goods known by the landlord or his agent to belong to persons other than the tenant or other occupants of such dwelling, (12) all goods
,known by the landlord or his agent to be subject to a recorded chattel morgage lien
or financing agreement, and (13) all agricultural implements ....
Section 4. A contractual landlord's lien shall not.be enforceable unless underlined
or printed in conspicuous bold print in the rental agreement.
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an alleged rental arrearage, apartment manager Jane Cronan entered the
apartment while Fancher was absent and removed a television set and stereo
components. Later that day Fancher received written notice of the seizure.
He brought an action in United States District Court, claiming that the rental
agreement was contrary to the public policy of the State of Texas and
thereby void. Fancher based his allegations on the premise that the action by
defendants constituted state action for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment, and that therefore he was denied procedural due process because he
did not receive prior notice or hearing before the items were seized. The
plaintiff also contended that he did not waive any rights to such notice or
hearing by signing his rental agreement. Held-For Plaintiff. Regardless of
the provisions of the written rental agreement, the landlord may not seize his
tenant's property without providing an opportunity for prior notice and
hearing. Such action constitutes a denial of due process; therefore, article
2
5236d is violative of the fourteenth amendment.
The present day landlord's lien is similar to the common law innkeeper's
lien. 3 In 17th century England, the dangers of traveling required that the
innkeeper accept all guests. He was completely responsible for the safety of
their possessions, but he also had a lien on a guest's property, excluding
clothing and other personal effects, until all reasonable and just charges were
4
paid.
From the common law innkeeper's lien evolved the statutory lien now
available in many jurisdictions throughout the United States to proprietors of
such establishments as boarding houses, apartment houses, motels and
hotels.3 The Texas Legislature in 1874 passed the predecessor of the current
landlord's lien statute in the form of a Hotel Operator's Baggage Lien Law,
following the guidelines of the common law innkeeper's lien. 6 This 1874 Act
was later amended to allow the hotel proprietor to take possession of the
guest's property.7 In 1969, article 5238a-more commonly known as the
"Baggage Lien for Rent" statute or the "Landlord's Lien" statute-went into
effect. 8
2. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
3. See Watkins v. Hotel Tutwiler Co., 76 So. 302, 304 (Ala. 1917); Stoll v. Almon
C. Judd Co., 138 A. 479, 481 (Conn. 1927).

See also Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1276 (1971).

4. See Cedar Rapids Inv. Co. v. Commodore Hotel Co., 218 N.W. 510, 511 (Iowa
1928); Fudge v. Downing, 27 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah 1933). See generally 40 AM. JUR.
2d Hotels, Motels & Restaurants § 187, at 1049 (1968).
5. See Stalcup & Williams, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Property, 24 Sw. L.J.

30, 32 (1970).

6. See Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: The Constitutionality of Texas' Landlord
Laws and Other Summary Procedures,25 BAYLOR L. REV. 215, 220 (1973).
7. TEx. REV. CIV, STAT. ANN. art. 4594 (1960).
8. Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 686, at 2008 provided in part:
The operator of any residential house, apartment, duplex or other single or multifamily dwelling, shall have a lien upon all baggage and all other property found
within the tenant's dwelling for all rents due and unpaid by the tenant thereof; and
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Thus from the common law landlord's right of distress 9 and the inkeeper's lien there developed a statute which gave the lessor a lien upon all
baggage and other property not exempt by statute, which was found within
the tenant's dwelling. This lien provided the landlord with the right to retain
such property until the amount of unpaid rent was tendered, and also
entitled the landlord to use self-help remedies for debt satisfaction.'0 Acting
under color of the law, the landlord determined not only the existence of the
unpaid rent, but also the need for immediate seizure of the tenant's property.
Under authority of the statute, the lessor could enter the tenant's apartment
with a pass-key while the latter was gone and remove any non-exempt item.
This was purely an extrajudicial, self-help remedy which afforded the tenant
no right to notice or hearing before his property was seized."
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held article 5238a unconstitutional
declaring that it worked a deprivation of property without allowing for due
process of law because it denied a tenant the right to be heard before his
chattels were seized by his landlord.' 2 In Hall v. Garson, 3 plaintiff
Claudine Hall returned to her apartment and discovered her television set
missing. She was allegedly in arrears on her rent, and her landlord had
seized her television under the authority of article 5238a; neither notice nor
hearing was provided before the set was removed. After taking the television, the landord notified Hall that it was being held for the rent and would
be returned upon payment of the arrearage. Rather than paying the disputed
rent, Hall brought suit individually and in the form of a class action
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas Landlord's Lien Statute under
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Hall decision, abrogating article 5238a, came in the wake of two4
United States Supreme Court decisions, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.'
and Fuentes v. Shevin. 15 Sniadach attacked the constitutionality of a
Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment procedure under which the plaintiff finance corporation had filed a garnishment complaint alleging indebtedness on a promissory noted executed by the garnishee.' 6 In striking down the
said operator shall have the right to take and retain possession of such baggage and
other property until the amount of such unpaid rent is paid.
9. This method of self-help developed from the feudal tenure relationship which
existed between lord and vassal, and was limited to the collection of a rent service due
,to the tenure relationship which existed between the landlord as owner of the reversion
and the tenant as owner of the leasehold estate. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.45,
at 473 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
10. Tex. Laws 1969, ch. 686, at 2008.
11. See Comment, Procedural Due Process: For Sale in Texas to the Highest
Bidder?, 10 Hous. L. REV. 880, 893 (1973).
12. Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
13. Id.
14. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
15. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
16. Texas civil procedure laws were not affected by Sniadach because wage garnish-
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prejudgment seizure, the Court held that notice and a fair hearing must be
afforded a garnishee before such a prejudgment wage garnishment could be
enforced. 7 In Fuentes, the Supreme Court invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania statutes which provided for summary seizure of goods in a person's
possession under a writ of replevin issued upon the ex parte application of
any other person claiming a right to those goods who posted a security
bond.' 8 The Fuentes decision resolved the dispute over the proper scope of
Sniadach, holding that the constitutional protection of procedural due process
can be properly applied to summary prejudgment actions other than a
prejudgment wage garnishment.'
Article 5238a, by allowing a landord to seize a tenant's property without
notice or hearing, was within the category of prehearing seizures affected by
the Sniadach and Fuentes decisions; therefore, the Texas Legislature expressly repealed that statute and replaced it with the somewhat more
restrictive article 5236d. 20 The present article denies the landord self-help as
to the tenant's property unless such right is specifically granted as a
contractual lien in the written rental agreement between the landlord and
tenant. 21 Under the statute the landlord is precluded from enforcing a
contractual landlord's lien unless such provision is underlined or printed in
22
bold, conspicuous type.
In Fancher v. Cronan,23 the federal district court refused to acknowledge
any true distinction between repealed article 5238a and article 5236d. It
chose instead to rely extensively on Hall v. Garson2 4 in determining that
ment is prohibited by the Texas Constitution. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; see TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (1966).
17. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339-42 (1969). See also Comment, Procedural Due Process: For Sale in Texas to the Highest Bidder?, 10 Hous.
L. REV. 880 (1973).
18. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92-93 (1972).
19. Id. at 90-93.
20. Art. 5238a was repealed effective Sept. 1, 1973, Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 441, § 5,
at 1228, and replaced by the Texas Landlord's Lien for Rent Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1975).
21. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1975). This contractual lien upon
chattels has been construed to be a chattel mortgage. See Thomas v. Gulfway Shopping
Center, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 756, 764 (S.D. Tex. 1970); United States v. Menier Hardware
No. 1, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448, 458 (W.D. Tex. 1963); Shwiff v. City of Dallas, 327
S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Leonard v. Burton,
11 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1928, no writ). See generally Wallenstein, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Property, 28 Sw. L.J. 27, 60 (1974).
22. TEx. REV. COv. STAT. ANN. art. 5236d (Supp. 1975). Some 13 categories of
property are nonetheless exempt from a duly authorized landlord's lien in a written
rental agreement. The list of exempt items does not include televisions, stereos, records,
musical instruments, typewriters, calculators, adding machines, certain paintings and
books, sewing machines, radios, clocks, certain furniture, sports equipment, or motorcycles or bicycles (if found within the tenant's dwelling or within the storage area). Id.

§ 2.

23. - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
24. 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
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article 5236d, like article 5238a, authorizes state-like action by permitting
the landlord to remove the tenant's property without prior notice or hearing. 25 Plaintiff Fancher based his claim on a charge that the taking of his
property was a violation of the Due Process Clause and that the 1964 Civil
Rights Act entitled him to relief. 26 That Act requires any alleged deprivation
of a constitutional or statutory right to be attributable to the actions of any
person "acting under color of state law."'27 In determining that the defendant's seizure constituted such state action, the court in Fancherrelied on the
reasoning employed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hall. In that
case the court held that although the alleged wrongful act was committed by
a person who was not an officer of the state or an official of any state
agency, the entry into the tenant's home and the seizure of his property was
an act characteristic of the state because such action has traditionally been
the function of a state officer, such as a sheriff or constable. 28
Although the defendants in Fancher argued that no state official was
involved in the seizure of the television set, the court agreed with the Hall
decision in that the acts of a private citizen can become the actions of the
state for purposes of the Civil Rights Act and under the Due Process Clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 29 The Hall decision went much further than
previous cases in holding that a private citizen acting alone can be acting
with the requisite state action necessary to constitute a cause of action under
section 1983. 30 The Fanchercourt was willing to rely on this precedent and
to ignore other holdings to the effect that a mere finding of state action is
insufficient to bring such a claim within the purview of section 1983. Those
cases have held that the proper test, where there is no direct state action, is
whether the state action rises to the level of significant involvement. 31
The Fancher court reinforced its ruling by relying on several decisions
which have held that self-help repossessions under Section 9-503 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 32 unlike the landlord's lien, do not involve state
25. Fancher v. Cronan, -

F. Supp.

-

(S.D. Tex. 1975).

26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).

27. In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966), the Court stated: "In
cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing
as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment."
28. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1970).
29. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
30. Compare Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) with Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) and Baldwin v. Morgan, 287 F.2d 750 (5th Cir.
1961).
31. See Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Adams v.
Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1006 (1974).

32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 provides, in part:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial
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action.33 The leading case in the Fifth Circuit is James v. Pinnix,3 4 in which
a purchaser of a used automobile brought a class action under section 1983
against an auto dealer to restrain him from further attempts at self-help
repossession of the automobile after default in payments, and to have the
statute authorizing such repossessions declared unconstitutional. The district
court granted the relief requested, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding a
lack of requisite state action.3 5 In refusing to extend the Hall state action
theory to cover the James situation, the court in James noted the difference
between the landlord-tenant relationship, emphasizing that in Hall the debt
arose from an agreement having nothing to do with the goods, and the
seizure of the tenant's property closely resembled a taking in satisfaction of a
judgment, which is traditionally performed by a state agent.36
Although the James court refused to apply the Hall doctrine, it did
recognize the doctrine as valid law; therefore, the court in Fancher was
confident in its reliance on Hall. In Hall, the landlady seized goods pursuant
to rights granted by statute,3 7 whereas in Fancher, the defendants seized
only those goods specified in the lease agreement to be seized in case of
default, and the goods were taken pursuant to the contractual agreement
between the parties.3 8 Perhaps as in James, the Fancher defendants "possessed and claimed no roving commission" arising out of a statute, but rather
39
derived their power to seize the goods solely from the lease agreement.
Other cases have affirmed the view set forth in James concerning UCC
Section 9-503. In Calderon v. United Furniture Co.,40 the appellant claimed
that because the furniture company which had sold him a washing machine
had its agents break into his home to repossess it, there was state action, thus
distinguishing his case from James and bringing it under the purview of Hall,
where the acts possessed many of the characteristics of the state. The court
in Calderon rejected that rationale, pointing out that the Texas Landlord's
process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action.
It should be noted that under § 9-104(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, the landlord's lien is specifically exempted from § 9-503.
33. See Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611-12 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v.
Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Nowlin
v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., 496 F.2d 16, 17 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006
(1974); Adams v Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974). See generally Spak, The Constitutionality of Repossession by Secured Creditors Under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
10 Hous. L. REV. 855 (1973).
34. 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
35. Id. at 208-209.
36. Id. at 208.
37. 430 F.2d 430, 433 (5th Cir. 1970). The Fifth Circuit held virtually the same
on a second appeal, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
39. James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974).

40. 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974).
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Lien Statute encompassed state action because it authorized the landlord to
and seize property which had no relationship
enter the tenant's home
41
whatsoever to the debt.
The court in Fancher denied the existence of any relationship between its
situation and the UCC 9-503 situations because of the landlord's lack of
secured interest in the property seized. 42 But the defendant's authority to
seize the tenant's property was derived solely from their contract, and while
the purchase of the property seized had not created the debt, the property
was related to the debt in that the plaintiff had granted the defendant a lien
on that property in the written lease agreement.
The defendants in Fancher conceded that if the action complained of
4
constituted state action, then the plaintiff was denied due process of law. 3
The federal district court again chose to rely on the Hall decision, noting that
what was said about article 5238a is also applicable to article 5236d. 44 In
Hall the court stated that under article 5238a the landlord himself decided
when to seize the tenant's property, without an impartial determination of
the validity of his claim, and without providing an opportunity for challenge
45
by the tenant.
Sniadach set forth the premise that due process can be achieved only by
the kinds of notice and hearing which attempt to validate the underlying
claim of the debtor before he is deprived of his property. 46 Fuentes extended
the requirements of notice and hearing under the fourteenth amendment; the
Supreme Court stated that broadly drawn statutes allowing prejudgment
seizure of property by state officers without an opportunity to be heard no
longer would withstand constitutional scrutiny. 4 7 The court in Fancher
notice and a
therefore relied on the reasoning that the tenant must be given
48
seizure.
any
to
prior
hearing
a
such
for
opportunity
reasonable
The Supreme Court held in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant ,Co.49 that a Louisiana
trial judge had not violated due process when he ordered personal property
sequestered without allowing prior notice or affording an opportunity for
hearing.5 0 The writ of sequestration was ordered upon an ex parte application of an installment sales creditor whose affidavit alleged an arrears in
41. Id. at 951. See also Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 498 F.2d 365 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974).
42. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
43. Id. at -.
44. Id. at -.
45. Id. at -.
46. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969).
47. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972).
48. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. -, - (S.D. Tex. 1975), citing North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
49. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
50. Id. at 605.
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payment creating a vendor's lien. The writ could have been dissolved
immediately by the debtor upon his bond, or upon the creditor's failure to
prove the debt, the lien, or the delinquency. The Supreme Court held that
this was an acceptable accommodation of the parties' conflicting interests in
the sequestered property.5 1 It was stressed throughout that the seller-creditor
had a legally recognized interest in the property seized, and as a result, the
court in Fancher did not hesitate in maintaining that Mitchell had no effect
on the landlord's seizure of plaintiff Fancher's property being a denial of due
52
process.
The court in Fancher reached a similar conclusion about North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,53 in which the Supreme Court held that
due process was violated when a Georgia court clerk issued a garnishment
summons, upon the ex parte application of the plaintiff on a bond where the
defendant maintained a bank account. 54 The plaintiff's application was
accompanied by an affidavit which asserted the debt sued upon and the
reason for apprehension of loss of the garnished sum. Defendant had no
notice or opportunity to be heard before the issuance of the process of
garnishment, but again, the Fancher court recognized no relation between its
situation and the one in North Georgia.5 5
The individual defendants in Fancher ignored the issue of plaintiff's
waiver of his rights in the signing of the rental agreement, but the State of
Texas, as intervenor, contended that the plaintiff accomplished "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege when he
signed the rental agreement." 56 The court rejected this argument, for lack of
proof, relying instead on the proposition for an effective waiver of due
process set forth in Fuentes. To insure validity under Fuentes, such a waiver
must appear in type commensurate in size with the type or print in the body
of the contract, must actually be bargained for on a status of equal and full
understanding of its meaning, and must be accompanied by an explanation
of its impact or must specifically describe what is in fact being waived.5 7 The
court held that the lease in Fancher did not satisfy these requirements,
particularly since the purported waiver was a printed part of a standard form
55
apartment lease and a necessary condition for rental.
The federal court's decision in Fancher leaves unanswered the question of
whether the Constitution prohibits a landlord and tenant from entering into a
51. Id. at 604.
52. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
53. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).
54. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 757, 42 L. Ed. 2d at 757.
55. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. -, - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
56. Id. at -; accord, D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86
(1972); Adams v. Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co., 376 F. Supp. 61, 67-68 (D.C. Nev. 1974).
See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
57. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94 (1972).
58. Fancher v. Cronan, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Tex. 1975).
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